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Abstract
International correlations through the last years have been remarked as dramatic in 
character, and very often followed through with unpredictable events, such as the 
Arab spring, chronic and confessional wars raging through the Middle east, than the 
unprincipled informal collation of the great forces merging with variety and different 
in character formal and less formal state-of-actors, than worth mentioning is the 
recent war prelude in Ukraine which on top has all been spiced and made far more 
constrictive indeed by the arrival of the global economic crisis in energy resources 
as well as naturally found ones, that has well paid so far contributing led to the 
overflowing of the crisis itself from the world’s center towards its margins. 
Since the end of the cold war, the most powerful and the most economically ascendant 
countries have started to promote a very new breed type of concept which deals 
with export and imposing of its own ideology. Diplomacy has well been turned into 
an instrument for realization of the external affair politics of the great powers and 
this diplomacy has been thus transformed from traditional in character to modern in 
origin, or better - public diplomacy. 
But this breed of public diplomacy had its own limits in terms of its range influence 
which was shortcut in the days of lack of energy resources as well as naturally found 
pack resources in the sense of energy excavation, and thus we witnessed the arrival of 
the newly formed type of diplomacy in place of the public diplomacy, named energetic 
diplomacy. 
Today energetic diplomacy is a representative of modern diplomacy or better a unique 
type of “stick and carrot” modulated for the weak and well developed rich states which 
are dependent on energy resources naturally found or not. 
During the era of the predomination of traditional politics over power in international 
correlations, it was then the most important thing who would be the one to deal with 
the most military power arsenal and later economic power as well that determined 
supreme leading force.
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Many of us would ask does this mean the reincarnation of the so called almost forgotten 
Cold War only now coming in such a shape that seems to be far more terrifying in 
character with a great deal of chance to impose the brink of a new world war and 
another humanitarian wash-out to humanity. 
Keywords: energetic diplomacy; pipeline diplomacy; great powers
Introduction
The choice of the topic for this text has been well determined by the deepening gab 
between the West and the East especially on the politically-economy driven variance 
and collision that escalates over the lack of energy resources as well as naturally found 
resources. The development of technology and the industry at the same as well as the 
competitiveness on the international market agenda have determined the need of 
constant apparel and whistle-up on cheap and unlimited resources of energy bedrock 
especially in the countries with high technical-technology shaped development. As a 
result, many countries have now turned into countries of major interest and importance 
only because those countries compose these so called energetic resources. Countries 
that pass on the route for the gas pipe line have now been turned into countries of 
great importance on the West and on the East both, although these countries have 
never been spared in these great geopolitical games where those very same countries 
run the risk of losing or gaining everything that they have following the path. However 
the countries that are along these route of energy resources imposed war, have been 
forced to dip towards some of the belligerent sides, or in case they remained neutral, 
than those very same countries had to pay their neutrality by territorial expropriation, 
which led their sovereignty and territorial integrity put into jeopardy. 
For that purpose a research in quality has been conducted using analytical-synthetic 
method of scientific research, by using separate analyses implied on data as well as 
using the process of systematizing of the facts obtained in a logical compound. 
The research has a final goal to openly reveal that energetic diplomacy is a sort of 
catalyzer present to build the new multi-polar world that will represent full reshape 
of current political boundaries especially in the European domain, but what is more 
to be able to provide new coalitions being composed and coming along, the creation 
of new centers of power which would base their power over foundations to access 
energetic resources.
The history of the birth of (pipeline) “tube-like diplomacy” or gas-pipe diplomacy. 
Since the beginning of the foregoing century there has been some kind of rivalry over 
the energy resource market. In other words, in the past, British - Russian rivalry is 
supposed that had been given birth of prior reason because of the discovery of the 
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energy resources capacity on the territory of the so called former Persia. Since those 
days ahead Russia is constantly keeping up pace on the energy pack exploitation. But 
it has not always been the case that using military arsenal would lead to a positive 
outcome over these particular type of war belligerent disputes. The collaboration and 
the built of (non) type - like formation of coalitions is always considered time sparing 
as well as force and means/goods sparing too, so as a result hereby we witness the 
arrival of this newly breed type of diplomacy setting the stage on being invented and 
incorporated through its communication coming along incorporated with it, which 
is well be determined by the need of energy resources and thus has been named 
energetic diplomacy. 
The general definition over what happens to be energetic diplomacy or 
“tube-like diplomacy” does not exist, but judging on the variables and the indicators 
that determine its shape and appearance one could say that it represents some kind 
of usage of external politics in order to deliver and secure access or transport of 
energetic supply in demand and promotion as well (most typically bilateral and even 
sometimes not so scarce multilateral) cooperation on the energy sector. 1
“Tube-like diplomacy” has been promoted for the first time in 2006 when as a state 
actor Gazprom has started to conduct its own relatively independent economical 
politics which has later shown that it has been nothing else but an instrument of the 
Russian official external politics affair bureau. So Gazprom in the reference of this has 
stopped at one point the gas supply to Ukraine over the so called balance that had to 
be calibrated and had to do with some allegedly of little importance minor regulative, 
but what is more this indeed has been the case whether further on Europe would 
be gas supplied or abandoned. It is made apparent that in the background of this 
there was the issue that made Ukraine lean slightly and in shame undetected towards 
the West which on the other hand is on the long run trace a major treat of Russia 
gaining access towards NATO and its western boundaries. At the same time Gazprom 
promotes the built of two pipelines, Northern and Southern stream in order to fully 
supply Western Europe in gas. The gas pipes are supposed to avoid the transit through 
Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia and the Baltic states, as well as the Crimea murky waters in 
order to reach Western Europe, which at the same time happens to be in competition 
with the gas line Nabuko which is Western supported and Western originated idea of 
a gas line stretching from the Caspian sea to the Western Europe. 
In any ways taken the project Southern stream is fairly significant as a result of the 
long ongoing hatch conflict between Russia and Ukraine over deliverance of high-
quality gas during the period from 2005-2010 through whereas a total of 18 European 
countries had been cut out on deliverance of the Russian gas. Because of the raging 
war in Ukraine where Russia gave support to home separatist forces (up to the point of 
1 Andreas Goldthau and Jan Martin Witte, Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game, Berlin, 2007
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the Crimea annexation) thereby sanctions getting imposed on Russia have been seen 
at the time, which followed through immediately when it came clear and apparent 
that the European Union took sides and openly rejected and opposed the Southern 
Stream by putting under the law the so called noncompulsory duty bound resolution 
that came in force, which immediately made separation of its membership states.2
The commercial character of the project Southern stream implicated on a kind of 
secretive diplomacy between the European countries and Russia which whatsoever 
moreover contributed for sharpening the negative conduct among the member states 
of the European union from the inside. As we all know today Russia has about 29% of 
the overall gas supply quantities that are to be found worldwide, which makes Russia 
a key player on the global energetic map getting a profit of about 20 billion dollars per 
year only for supplying the EU with gas. This is exactly what makes Russia use Gazprom 
in its main role of supplying gas to Europe, using of course high quality natural found 
gas reserves through the shipping process, simply because supplying inadequate 
quantities or improvised solution of any other kind is simply too risky and unaffordable 
solution to Russia in terms of economy prospect growth, and such an example is clearly 
made with the project establishing the free project trade deal between the US and the 
EU whereas US could constantly supply gas to Europe in a liquid state,gas derived not 
form quality gas reserves but rather extracted and manufactured from goods such as 
leaf stone. 3
Steve LeVine the author of the book ‘’The Oil and the Glory’’ (published in 2007) considers 
that when it comes to energetic geopolitical crucial role played by transnational 
companies especially the western part of it (we refer to those enterprises having their 
seats in some of the western countries) and which in the part concerning energetic 
infrastructure tightly cooperate with Gazprom just for the sake of financial issues as 
a main reason pointed in chief role. Under such case those enterprises can surely 
work even opposing external state politics (USA and Great Brittan) which would surely 
contribute for a discontinuity over energetic politics applied on Russia by Western 
powers along head USA. As under such circumstances Russia has been given dominance 
on the energy market standing ahead of its opposing forces,and as a second reason 
appointed here would be the speedy growing superior military power of Russia which 
makes it possible for Russia to trace the route of energy pathway by using combination 
of softened and hardened power both implicated.4 
Also according to the author, the increase on the price of gas supplies for East European 
countries, especially the equal prices ratio composed compared to those of gas supply 
2 Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippos Proedrou, EU-Russia Energy Diplomacy: The Need for an Active Strategic Partnership, EU 
Diplomacy Papers 4/2012 
3 Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippos Proedrou. op.cit., pp.4-8
4 Gagea Andreea. Diplomacy in the Games of Power. Diplomacy of Power – Power of Diplomacy. Bucharest Academy of Economic 
Studies. 2011.
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prices for Western Europe have significantly contributed for a couple of revolution 
bursts throughout these alleged states which on the whole picture lead to imposing 
puppet governments representatives in those countries led by Russia itself. 
At the same time if Europe is to ask for any other alternative on gas supply deliverance, 
Russia would then string band or export gas to Central Asia which makes Russia again 
the dominant power to negotiate. As Russia follows the path of being the key player for 
gas shipping to states consumers, China on the other hand also has its own energetic 
policy in terms of establishing its own diplomacy on getting hands to much cheaper 
and reliable gas supplies on the primes of what Europe has to negotiate with,all with 
a simple reason on having their own industrial and technological boom and flourish 
which would put China in front of Western European states ahead in role position 
number one talking about competition.5 
Just to make an example we can surely claim that in 2006 according to reliable sources 
Russia took the first position in 6 other destinations found most desirable for foreign 
investment. This is due to the developed hybrid system of internal economy agenda 
and policy as well as their private sector with a tendency to establish transnational 
economy.6 Thanks to the economic development Russia successfully managed to tie 
their debts to the Paris club creditor depository, which was a debt of an incredible 
amount counting 160 billion American dollars in value. 7
At the dawn of the 21 century, Russia has the largest reserves of energetic resources 
manageable (gas export established in 2005 of about 152, 4 billion cubic meters, oil 
export value of about 470, 2 million tons), opposing Europe’s reserves which on the 
total compose only 3%of the total world reserves found elsewhere, which puts Russia 
and Europe on a mutual harness conditioned by row of economical preset conditioning 
trade deals. As for an example Germany pays for its own gas needs for about 42% 
export from Russia. Italy at 32% rate, France at 30 %, Austria at 75% and the last but 
not the least Finland at the highest rate of dependency on Russia gas supply reserves 
composing a total hit of 100% stake. 8
But although Russia and Europe maintain excellent partnership, the biggest of problems 
sorting out is the very dialog of EU on ratifying the Energetic diploma roll, which at the 
5 Having become a net importer of oil in 1993, China can no longer cover domestic demand through its generic reserves, 
amounting to a mere 1.3 percentage of the world’s total. The country consumed 7.45 million barrels a day in 2006, about twice 
its domestic production and 9 present of global demand. The majority of China producing oil fields has matured. While China 
decreasing domestic oil production may be partially compensated by increasing volumes generated by coal to liquid plants, 
overall imports shares will rise from51% in 2004 to 85% in 2030. By that times Chine is expected to be both the world’s second 
largest oil consumer (behind USA and before EU) and the world second largest oil importer. As for gas, Chine is projected to 
increase both consumption and imports. As the International Energy Agency estimates, the Chines import market will not expand 
beyond 106 billion cubic meters by 2030. Source: BP (2007) International Energy Agency (2007) pp.105, 118.
6 John Lough, Russia’s Energy Diplomacy, May 2011 | REP RSP BP 2011/01
7 John Lough op.cit., pp.3-7
8 John Lough op.cit., pp.4-9
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same represents a sort of political declaration however the contract being part of this 
roll is considered a document of value and deliverance. 
The reasons for not ratifying the roll, is chiefly the (dis) regulation of three important 
questions connected to the roll contract. Firstly comes the nuclear material trade, 
secondly the additional investment protocol and finally the transit protocol regulative. 
Russia and the Baltic states (hard and soft power–composure of energetic diplomacy)
With the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia has become a successor of most of the 
usable resources to be found in the former Soviet Union. A Large part of such reserves 
are also to be found in other countries such as Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Armenia, and 
Turkmenistan, but these countries apart form Russia have neither the financial capital 
nor the the technology affordable to take advantages of those resources. 
Talking about the Baltic States, one could almost surely claim that they are at about 
90% dependant from oil and 100 percent dependant on gas supplies from Russia.9 This 
is due to the fact that in the past the whole of the infrastructure of these countries 
had been built within the Soviet Union complex, as a part of it, and so as a result these 
countries now withstand no other possible way affordable to supply themselves with 
gas and oil but Russia. 10
These states however still have the possibility to fully integrate within the boundaries 
of the European energetic integrated system(which is by the way still in its infant 
stage of development), and in this way to be able to connect themselves with the gas 
or pipeline apart from Russia and the infrastructure built during the Soviet era. The 
project itself is named Baltic Connector. But the same project has been pretty much 
encumbered simply because Russian Gazprom controls the dominance of most of the 
Baltic gas/oil companies, which makes this project overall very expensive indeed. 11
Russia creates energetic diplomacy (through the known formidable and well recognized 
components of both soft and hard power) to be able to influence the politics of both 
internal and external tie to its neighbor countries. There are three way of using hard 
power (part of the energetic diplomacy): setting embargo upon gas, oil and nuclear 
energy. Such is the case where the countries legislative members of the Community of 
independent (Ukraine Belarus and Kazakhstan) as well as the Baltic states altogether 
are being under the embargo or have been dictated the prices of energy resources in 
order to fully integrate and influence to dominance their external public affairs politics. 
9 Grigas, A. (2012). Legacies, coercion and soft power: Russian influence in the Baltic States. Chatham House Briefing Paper, 4.
10 Estonia has started with its own production of oil from oil reserve fields giving on estimation about 55 % from the whole demand 
of energy for Estonia. On contrary Latvia and Lithuania are totally dependant on Russian gas and have no natural reserves for their 
own manufacturing of oil but still could be slightly independent if they connect to terminals to the Baltic Sea. 
11 Maigre, M. (2010). Energy security concerns of the Baltic states. International Centre for Defense Studies.
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However, Russia is fully aware and thus cautious on the usage of hard power on the 
Baltic States, simply because Russia has a large financial intake on the three of the 
largest gas companies in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Eesti GaAs, Latvijas и Lietuvos 
Dujos).12 The next reason is that there are some local non-state holder actors that 
could lobby within the membership of these governments. But the biggest of reason s 
is the reason that Russia has its own enclave (Kalingrad) which is separated by its own 
state and is to be found on the Baltic Sea, so the lack or shortage for energy resources 
on Lithuania would also mean shortage on energy resources for Kalingrad too. 13 
Apart from the hard power Russia also uses its soft power through the open support of 
minorities in these states which count to be Russian. This type of support at the same 
time promotes its own culture, education, sport which is especially affordable for the 
majority of those declared non-Russian, simply because those type of promotion and 
culture liberation advance offer scholarship of varieties, free education in Moscow, 
citizenship and such similar advantages. But the highest stake of the Russian soft 
power is the convenience of the Russian energetic sector with mixed character where 
its own share sustains Russian businessman and company holders. The nuclear energy 
offer at stake as well has additionally stimulated the economy of these countries which 
creates for the ‘’stone tripping ‘’ on the inside internal politics of these countries. 
Russia and the European Union 
European Union is a complex hybrid system of rule where intergovernmental and 
supra international elements have deeply presented the complexity on the model of 
its structure and energy exchange along European soil.14 
The partnership between Russia and the EU has been characterized by numerous of 
conflicts and cooperative elements, and this is result of the fact that large quantities of 
these reserves that Russia holds are main factor on its economic and political stability 
in terms of power, and at the same time they represent the most important tool for 
Russia in its creation of its outside politics. Russia obtains the largest gas reserves in 
the world, second largest in gas and coal reserves. It is at the same time the first and 
largest export of natural gas country and almost comes to a draw line talking about oil 
export along side Saudi Arabia. 15 
Talking about the relation between the EU and Russia it is worth of significance to 
mention that their independent correlation and mutual need is based upon economic 
burden especially on energy filed. Although the EU is largely dependant on the 
12 Klevas, V. & Antinucci, M. (2004). Integration of national and regional energy development programs in Baltic States. Energy 
Policy, 32(3), 345- 355. doi:10.1016/S0301-4215(02)00296-3
13 Grigas, A. (2012). Legacies, coercion and soft power: Russian influence in the Baltic States. Chatham House Briefing Paper, 26.
14 Hix and Høyland 2011; Staab 2008
15 Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippos Proedrou. op.cit., pp.3-7
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Russian energy resources the same EU works on sort of a diversion process in order to 
slightly lessen the dependence and to create its own space to be able to trade energy 
resources. The energetic politics of its members are often seen different guided by 
their own interest but also impact take the non state business companies where 
energy politics is not national, but rather different form the foundations of the state 
politics or the overall EU energy politics being led. Contrary to this Gazprom is fully 
incorporated with the political agenda of Kremlin and have a common goal altogether. 
Within the EU the key role to take on outside energetic politics has the European 
Commission and the Council of ministry, but still the energy politics of its member 
states is under national treasure hold. 
The role of the European Commission is constant function of the European inside 
market and at the same time being responsible to deregulate the national energetic 
market and the incline of the competition. Also according to the Lisbon agreement 
the European Union has the role to perform critical and crucial overlook and at the 
same time takes the responsibility to fundamental basis through the energy politics of 
the union. Although the Commission is appointed to deal with the energy negotiation 
dialog with Russia as well as other important supplies still the countries holding 
membership have their own full status and sovereignty talking about most of the energy 
trade aspects especially those being set to a critical phase.16 The Commission tries to 
establish and modulate some kind of unified code model, a liberal energy market for 
the EU, but still has no authority to organize the assembly of what is considered to be 
energetic politics on the whole region and community. The goal of the commission 
is to grant a unique energy resource market and in this way to influence the price 
of the resources that is the energy resources indeed and to fully secure safety on 
the energy resource market. Also the commission itself is highly occupied with the 
process of internationalization of the energy companies, in order to efficiently direct 
the competition and to enhance the functioning of the internal market of energy. 
Today in the EU the dominant several energy companies which of the Russian Gazprom, 
the German E.OH Ruhr gas the Italian Eni, the Dutch Gasunie and the Norwegian Norsk 
hydro.17 This type of concentration of power influences the possibility to decrease the 
competition in case there is an economic agreement between them and at the same 
time it can prohibit the competition of a new company holder setting the stage. 
For this purpose the EU commission offered the solution to make a split and a net 
possession holding as a given preterm for growth of competition and the creation of 
new well operating functions open in terms of a creation of a liberal market to guard 
against monopoly, where the dominant role will be undertaken in such way to open 
space for energetic climate creation apart form Russia. 
16 Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippos Proedrou. op.cit., pp.6
17 Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippos Proedrou. op.cit., pp.4-8
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The aggressive Russian energetic diplomacy in the age of ‘’New’’ Europe
The new energetic Russian diplomacy is founded under such principles that 
the ‘’New’’ Europe is made dependant fully on the Russian gas shipping. 
When I refer to the term ‘’New Europe’’ I imply on the fact that although some states 
members of the European Union have imposed their sanctions upon Russia they have 
not yet stopped to cooperate in the field of shipping energy resources.18 The project 
Northern stream has been planned to deliver natural gas to Germania via direct route 
avoiding Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and the Baltic states, which makes for the full 
dependency of Germany on Russian gas delivery. 19 The Northern stream has managed 
Russia to maintain different breed of politics established towards both old and new 
Europe:
Expansion of energetic ties with the new Europe (the carrot) and at the same time 
putting on more aggressive approach in terms of blackmail and terms preset to the old 
Europe, those countries that led the sanction campaign enclosure towards Russia(the 
stick). 
Such was the case made apparent with the embargo line being imposed on Latvian 
anchor Ventspils, which is mainly used for gas delivery shipping especially what was of 
significance during the Soviet era. 
At the same time under such circumstances Russia has highly staked and clearly 
demanded to make a ransom for the shipyard, but it came to a decline reproach as for 
the solidifying of the imposed sanctions by the Western allies.20 
But the effective Russian energetic geopolitics led by the principle that gas can flow 
only from Russia has made its zeal compete, even under such circumstances that 
if the shipyard would be sold to the West, without its pipeline it would represent 
no significant economic or commercial meaning added to its existence. The Russian 
expansion politics being imposed on has come to a numerous large number of 
countries that are willing to use Russian gas in order to pack (dis)formal alliances 
through different multinational corporations in order no to be put the blame on at 
18 In the literature one could come ascross the term old or New Europe,where Old Europe is identified through the concept of the 
old states of Eastern Europe part of the Soviet Uniot. New europe contrary is identified with the part of the European countries 
that are not in agreemernt with the offical politics of the EU and have their own concepts of their own independant energetic 
diplomacy.
19 Larsson, Robert (2006a), “Russia’s Energy Policy: Security Dimensions and Russia’s Reliability as an Energy Supplier”, FOI, 
Stockholm, http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir1934.pdf (02.04.2007).
This deal, Slovakia and the Baltic states have compared it with the deal of the World War two between Ribbentrop for partnership 
between Russia and Germany on the damage of all other alleged European partners. Without any doubts this kind of deal meant 
that Central and Eastern Europe were weakened, and at the same time loss of significant amount of money on the countries that 
gas pipe lines flowed as a result of their minor geopolitical significance to come. 
20 Laurila, J. (2003). Transit transport between the European Union and Russia in light of Russian geopolitics and economics. 
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade.
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fault for disrespecting the sanctions rule imposed on Russia and the same time to be 
able successful to provide cheap gas or transit through their own state. 
Russia and the Balkans 
Following the trans economy for managing any kind of diplomacy one could clearly 
say that energetic diplomacy is a highly positioned one on the international diplomatic 
scene. The same is composed of five sub elements that determine success, and that is 
the soft power to secure a row of financial bonuses (finance and transit to lower prices 
in order to supply gas), attract foreign investments as a result of the political stability 
of the state and the enlargement of its energetic market. The fourth is the industrial 
development of the state and last but not the least (where hard power steps in as 
well) the political survival of the young and not so stable states.
Within the ranks of the energetic diplomacy the Balkans does not have to consider the 
fact less important that although the Balkans represents a small energetic market, still 
its mayor influence lies within its geo strategic location especially taken as a explicitly 
appropriate space that it occupies suitable for transit and gas supply to Western 
Europe. 
After the collapse of the project Southern stream because of the Bulgarian fall out, 
today as a replica we have the very well renounced project called Turkish stream that 
takes on pipeline establishment protrude Russia through Turkey, Greece, Serbia, and 
Hungary in order to supply Europe with gas of high octane quality. The build up of this 
stream pipe line would make a lot of political as well as (strategic) economical and 
financial benefits for these countries making the stream affordable. 
On the long run, the benefits from the transit would multiply by using the gas, and 
the financial incomes from the transit route, as well as the development of the home 
bound industry. 
In the meantime taking it into consideration the fact that Balkans have been burdened 
by ethno national conflicts space disputes, Turkish stream is being taken as a sort 
of a craven egg and as for the countries they do represent in they essence of this a 
deep separation route being followed on their accomplice on the build and transit of 
the pipeline. So by governments in some states the whole project was taken a a fully 
anti-western project, even what is more they have managed to convince their own 
citizens that it is more or less the case of the “Iron curtain” stepping into power once 
again moving from the East towards the gates of the West. The reasons for this surely lie 
on the bad experience from the cold war where most of the countries were dispatched 
on one or the other belligerent side. It is beyond doubt that the Turkish stream has a 
large impact on the geostrategic game and that the same is a sort of a “midwife” upon 
the birth of a large new empire in a multi polar world. The governments of the states 
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should commit wise and right decisions on the long run continuity in order to sustain 
both political and energetic stability in their own countries. 
Conclusion
The numerous challenges determined by the new societies and world occupied 
process in flow have postulated another kind of (dis)institutional diplomacy called 
energetic diplomacy. The same is now multi dimensional and represents a sort of a 
conglomerate consisting economy, politics and military diplomacy. 
The onset thesis suggests that energetic diplomacy on the international scene has 
implicated establishment of new political relation between the states that belong to 
a communion with states that does not belong to that very communion, but rather 
have their own sphere of interest of political-economic character whereas other 
national interest are being left over, or that is the interest of the states altogether in a 
community. 
The integration of the energetic diplomacy on the international diplomatic scene 
has been seen as a process of transnational economy or struggle to access natural 
resources among political elites of the world energetic arena. 
The energetic diplomacy is considered to be mac-effect of geopolitics, simply because 
the same is taken by all scientific laborers as phenomena in the world today when 
because of shortage of resources and energy the most vulnerable are indeed the 
countries that put their own advance in technology and progress on the energy 
resources indeed. Also the development and the innovation dominance in the world 
today take on the whole the military component as an instrument of energetic 
diplomacy (the hard power as a component) and for that purpose exactly energetic 
diplomacy has evolved in three direction concepts exactly. 
The first concept is to develop good relationship and economic establishment relation 
on the countries through which the pipeline will flow. That means exactly that the 
exporter state of energy resources will have to create a climate to instigate mutually 
acceptable energetic diplomacy with the countries that would sign the deal to transit 
and supply gas. As an apparent example made is the case of the ongoing process 
between Russia, Armenia, and Turkey these days. Armenia on the occasion of 200 
years of the genocide over the Armenian people done by Turkey, on the occasion of 
this has been claimed the world open question for it in the sense of Turkey accepting 
the full blame of committing war crime horrors. The same question was hold open and 
came to full support by the pope, which made Turkey react swiftly and sharply on it. 
Taking into consideration the fact that Russia took good energetic establishment soil 
on the premises of energetic diplomacy with Turkey and also made exclusive trade 
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deals to supply and transit gas to Europe, it was inevitable for Russia in this sense 
to hold ground upon the question openly. On the other side Russia has established 
good political and cultural relations with Armenia and at the same time its territory 
supports a reserve territory as well for the Russian gas in case there is a cut on the 
Turkish stream project,when the world’s energetic diplomacy would most likely set 
the stage open. 
The energy diplomacy has been said already to obtain two types of components both 
the hard and the soft type of power and on the whole it represents a sublimate of 
mixed political, economic military and cultural diplomacy in order to achieve the goal. 
The second concept is geopolitical meaning on the countries that the pipe transits. It 
is clear that it is of great significance (especially for the smaller countries and weaker 
ones) to be geographical part of the route that the gas line leads, because on the long 
run it would mean both political stability and financial support benefits. 
The third concept is creation of a common partnership blocks and union as a result of 
this so called transnational cooperation on the field of energetic power. Talking about 
unions we need to make a reminder that these natural unions (natural because of 
the economic burden of the countries mutually independent from the pie line and its 
transit flow) almost always evolve from a political- economy military alliances. 
Taking into consideration the current situation on the region especially dealing with 
the project Turkish stream as well as the economic attraction that is being offered, it is 
essential to impose on the question of what would be the political discourse of Republic 
Macedonia in such geopolitical constellations. The cultivating of the current military 
neutrality could be a preset conditioning for a successful and prompt realization of 
the sphere of interest of the great powers. What is more energetic diplomacy could 
also be supported by a business corporations and for that purpose a full reform on the 
economy sector is needed, in other words an adequate change on the functionality 
and the proactive role played in within the outside or external public affair politics of 
the country, as a represent to lead its own independent energetic diplomacy. 
It is likely that Macedonia besides the opportunity to establish part of the Turkish 
stream pipeline could also seek for another alternative over energetic security, so it 
should not exclude the possibility to join the Trans Atlantic (TAP) although the same 
project is to be fully implemented no sooner than 2023. Whatever the pipeline the 
state should affirm to go to, the basic guideline should be the regional intercepting 
and netting into trans frontier energetic infrastructure which will secure long term 
energetic stability. 
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